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 Sound financial regulation does not require choosing between governmental 
and private action.  Instead, optimal regulatory solutions often blend the 
expertise and adaptability of private-sector influence with the stabilizing effects 
of federal oversight.  This collaborative framework has a rich history in U.S. 
derivatives regulation, which has long relied on self-regulatory organizations 
(“SROs”) like exchanges, clearinghouses, and the National Futures Association 
to help promote market stability and customer protection.  SROs remain subject 
to oversight by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), which 
guards against the proverbial fox-in-the-henhouse scenario while advancing 
quintessential government functions like mitigating systemic risk. 
 The advantages of this self-regulatory framework were underscored in 2020, 
when the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic spurred unprecedented volatility 
across U.S. derivatives markets.  Effectively navigating the market effects of the 
pandemic required a calibrated approach that drew from the advantages of 
SROs and the CFTC.  The integrated response that emerged is a model for how 
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Debates about the ideal form of regulation often pose a false 
dichotomy, sorting regulatory efforts into two seemingly oppositional 
categories: governmental or private. But this division offers an overly 
simple account of the regulatory structures that define modern 
administrative law. Instead, sound regulation is, more often than not, the 
result of collaboration between traditional governmental functions and self-
regulatory measures performed by private actors. Far from being at odds 
with each other, government and the private sector often work together to 
produce regulatory solutions that balance effective oversight with the 
flexibility needed to adapt to changing circumstances. 
This article will identify and discuss the virtues of both governmental 
and self-regulation, identifying specific examples of each. As Chairman of 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), my analysis will 
focus on the U.S. derivatives markets, which offer an ideal vantage point 
for examining self-regulation. The general framework for self-regulation 
has evolved over time, but its core structure has been preserved. As 
discussed in detail below, self-regulatory organizations (SROs) play a 
critical role in regulating the derivatives market, subject to broad CFTC 
oversight. This structure has for decades combined the key contributions of 
both the private sector and government into an integrated regulatory system 
that has proven adaptable to change. Just as an accurate study of 
government in the United States cannot consider only the President, 
Congress, and the Judiciary while omitting state and local governments, so 
too must an inquiry into U.S. derivatives market focus on SROs. 
One especially timely example of the self-regulatory framework in 
practice followed the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, which took hold 
in the United States in 2020 and produced unprecedented market volatility 
in March of that year.2 For participants in the U.S. derivatives markets, 
successfully navigating the effects of COVID-19 required an integrated 
approach that tapped the strengths of both governmental and self-regulatory 
measures. In responding to an economic crisis of historic proportions, the 
CFTC and derivatives SROs came together to foster stability through 
collaboration. 
 
 1 This article is based on a presentation I gave at the Annual Brodsky Family JD-MBA 
Lecture Series at Northwestern University, Pritzker School of Law, Chicago, Illinois on 
November 9, 2020. I would like to express my immense gratitude to Daniel J. Grimm, who 
served as Senior Counsel to the Chairman, for his outstanding work on this article. 
 2 See Heath Tarbert, Volatility Ain’t What it Used to Be, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 23, 2020) 
(describing historic volatility across nearly every asset class, including futures, equities, and 
fixed-income securities) [hereinafter Tarbert, Volatility]. 
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I. A SELF-REGULATORY TRADITION 
A. Derivatives Exchanges 
Self-regulation has long been a hallmark of the U.S. derivatives 
markets, predating the Grain Futures Act of 1922.3 The CFTC is a relative 
newcomer in the long history of derivatives self-regulation, arriving long 
after the Governor of Illinois signed legislation granting the Chicago Board 
of Trade (CBOT) self-regulatory authority over its members on February 
18, 1859.4 This act by the Illinois Governor was the first effort by 
government to formalize self-regulation in the derivatives markets, granting 
the CBOT self-regulatory authority over futures trading in the core 
agricultural commodities of wheat, corn, and oats.5 In the years that 
followed, the CBOT expanded its self-regulatory approach to exchange-
traded futures by implementing member rules for margin6 and delivery, and 
by prohibiting “corners,” a manipulative technique that drives commodity 
prices higher by obtaining large positions in both spot commodities and 
their associated futures contracts.7 CBOT’s October 4, 1868 prohibition on 
corners was another watershed event, reflecting the first-ever regulatory 
effort to prevent market manipulation.8 These and other early exchange 
rules were “self-policing or enforced by contract,”9 laying the framework 
for the development of a self-regulatory system that would persist through 
the present day—branching out from traditional agricultural futures 
contracts to products involving swaps and digital assets.10 
What is especially remarkable about self-regulation by derivatives 
 
 3 42 Stat. 998 (1922), 7 U. S. C. §§ 1-17 (1926). In describing the long history of self-
regulation in the derivatives markets, former President and CEO Daniel J. Roth of the 
National Futures Association said, “[t]he United States Congress first passed legislation 
regulating futures markets in 1922. By that time, self-regulatory mechanisms for those 
markets had already been in place for over 74 years.” Daniel J. Roth, former President and 
CEO of NFA, “American Experience in Self-Regulation Over Futures Markets and 
Jurisdictional Boundaries Between Futures and Securities in the U.S.,” speech at the 
International Seminar on Legislation of Futures Laws (Zhengzhou, China, Nov. 12, 2014). 
 4 U.S. CFTC, “History of the CFTC: US Futures Trading and Regulation Before the 
Creation of the CFTC,” https://www.cftc.gov/About/HistoryoftheCFTC/history_ 
precftc.html. [hereinafter CFTC, History]. The CBOT was founded on April 3, 1848, and 
engaged in informal self-regulatory measures since that time. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 3. 
 5 Id. 
 6 CBOT’s first margin requirements took the form of “performance bonds” that were 
posted by buyers and sellers. See CME Group, “Timeline of CME Achievements,” 
https://www.cmegroup.com/company/history/timeline-of-achievements.html. 
 7 See CFTC, History, supra note 4. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, In Praise of Middlemen: The Regulation of 
Market Intermediaries in Developing Economies, 37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 153, 159 (2005). 
 10 See, e.g., Roth, supra note 3 (while “the markets themselves, government regulation 
and self-regulation have all changed dramatically over the years, but to this day privately 
funded self-regulation remains the first line of defense” for the derivatives markets). 
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exchanges11 like the CBOT is that it predates the establishment of the 
CFTC by 115 years. During this period, the exchanges engaged in self-
regulation because they recognized “that it was simply ‘good business’ to 
discourage sharp practices which could undermine the vital public 
confidence in the exchanges.”12 Based on this view, “as long as 100 years 
before the first Federal legislation in the area, the exchanges . . . had some 
sort of a self-regulatory system complete with codes of conduct, 
surveillance procedures, and disciplinary powers.”13 
It was not until October of 1974 that Congress passed and President 
Ford signed into law the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, 
which established the CFTC as an independent federal regulatory agency 
with oversight over that majority of the U.S. derivatives markets.14 Part of 
the motivation to create the CFTC was the perceived need to provide 
federal oversight over the self-regulation performed by the existing 
derivatives exchanges. In deliberating over the formation of the CFTC, one 
senator explained, “[t]o date, self-regulation has been left to the exchanges, 
. . . It is difficult to act both as the law enforcer and the accused.”15 
The prevailing view became that while the “day-to-day operations of 
the exchanges should be left to the exchanges . . . a Federal agency should 
have broad supervisory powers” over them in turn.16 An example legislators 
 
 11 It is important to note that derivatives exchanges and derivatives clearing 
organizations function as SROs. See, e.g., Gideon Mark, Spoofing and Layering, 45 J. CORP. 
L. 399, 459 (2020) (“Self-regulation in the futures markets primarily occurs under the 
umbrella of CME Group, Inc., a publicly traded entity that operates four SROs and DCMs--
CME, CBOT, NYMEX, and NYMEX’s subsidiary COMEX . . . .”); see also David B. 
Spence & Robert Prentice, The Transformation of American Energy Markets and the 
Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C.L. REV. 131, 151 (2012) (“Commodities exchanges like 
NYMEX or the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) . . . are membership organizations that 
engage in considerable self-regulation under the oversight of a federal regulator—in this 
case the CFTC.”); CFTC, Request for additional comments on self-regulation and self-
regulatory organizations (“SROs”), 70 FED. REG. 71090, 71090 n.1 (Nov. 25, 2005) 
(defining SROs to “include designated contract markets . . . derivatives clearing 
organizations . . . and registered futures exchanges.”). 
 12 119 Cong. Rec. H11352-11355, at H11352 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1973) (statement of 
Rep. Poage). 
 13 Id. 
 14 However, the federal government did have a hand in derivatives regulation prior to 
1974, most particularly through Commodity Exchange Authority, the predecessor to the 
CFTC that was housed inside the U.S. Department of Agriculture. See CFTC, History, supra 
note 4; see also 119 Cong. Rec. SI8963-18966 at SI8964, SI8965 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1973) 
(discussing the role of the Commodity Exchange Authority in regulating the futures 
markets). 
 15 119 Cong. Rec. S23495-520, at 496 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1973) (statement of Sen. 
Hart); See also Jerry W. Markham, The role of self-regulation, 13A Commodities Reg. § 
26:1 (Mar. 2020) (“Self-regulation seeks to permit the exchange members to regulate their 
own conduct and play the primary role in regulation, while the government plays a residual, 
oversight role.”). 
 16 119 Cong. Rec. S23495-520, at 496 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1973) (statement of Sen. 
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considered was the setting of margin for derivatives trading. In broad terms, 
margin is “money or other high-quality collateral that buyers and sellers 
exchange to protect against the risk of default.”17 Margin assumes two 
forms: initial and variation.18 Initial margin “is like a security deposit” and 
is required to trade.19 Variation margin addresses changes in market value 
and must be posted if a trader’s position loses value.20 Together, initial and 
variation margin reduce counterparty credit risk associated with trading 
uncleared swaps.21 
While the exchanges “are more intimately acquainted” with margin 
“than a Federal agency,” that alone does not address the situation of an 
exchange setting margin too low.22 “In such a situation, the Federal 
Government should have [the] power to change the margin.”23 In balancing 
these interests, many in Congress sought to preserve the self-regulatory 
history of the derivatives market while creating appropriate federal 
oversight, resulting in a system that “gives the initial decisionmaking power 
to the exchange, with oversight power in the [CFTC].”24 The CFTC’s role 
was to act as “an impartial umpire” to “regulate and handle the public 
interests, the producers’ interests, and the consumers’ interests.”25 
Senator Herman Talmadge put it more directly, explaining that “[t]he 
creation of a strong regulatory commission is not meant to deprive 
exchanges of self-regulation, but rather to assure they assume responsible 
and adequate self-regulation.”26 In forming the CFTC, it was thus critical 
that the new agency be given “the tools to require that the exchanges 
perform their regulatory functions better.”27 This sentiment informed the 
self-regulatory system that grew in the years following the CFTC’s creation 
in 1974. 
A Senate hearing in 1982 provides historical context regarding the 
dual growth of self-regulatory exchanges and the oversight role of the then-
recently created CFTC: 
 
Hart). 
 17 Tarbert, Volatility, supra note 2. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 119 CONG. REC. S23495-520, at 496 (Dec. 20, 1973) (Senator Philip A. Hart). 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 H.R. 13113 CONG. REC. H2923, 2928 (Apr. 11, 1974) (Rep. John M. Zwach). 
 26 120 CONG. REC. S16127-16137, at S16131 (Sept. 9, 1974). Senator Dole added, “[f]or 
viable, active markets, the exchanges largely regulate themselves, as they should. The 
Commodity Exchange Authority has served to watch over the operations of these self-
regulated exchanges.” The reason to form the CFTC was that the growth in the futures 
markets required more robust oversight of the exchanges’ self-regulatory efforts. Id. 
 27 Id. 
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Since 1922 government . . . has exercised regulatory authority [over 
the derivatives markets], primarily by providing oversight of exchange self-
regulation. When, in 1974, Congress provided the Commission with 
additional and more powerful regulatory tools than its predecessor agency 
had possessed . . . self-regulation was maintained as the first line of 
defense. The terms of the [Commodity Exchange] Act and the limited 
resources allotted [to] the Commission made clear that initial responsibility 
for the operation of the futures markets is left to the private sector and the 
self-regulators. The Commission plays an important oversight role in that 
[it] directly intercede[s] when in the Commission’s judgment it is warranted 
to do so.28 
Four years later, a congressional assessment similarly concluded that 
the self-regulatory arrangement was functioning as designed: the CFTC 
“monitors the exchanges’ activities on a continuous basis” through both on-
site personnel and rule enforcement reviews “to determine the effectiveness 
of exchange self-regulation.”29 The report concluded that this system “has 
proven over the decades to provide effective, but not overly burdensome, 
regulation of these fast-paced markets.”30 
While the derivatives markets of today innovate at a pace much faster 
than during the early days of CFTC regulation, the unique balance between 
self-regulation by derivatives exchanges and CFTC oversight has endured. 
This balanced arrangement is distinct from systems of private ordering, 
which posit that private industry should perform nearly all regulatory tasks 
independently.31 But striking the appropriate balance is not always a simple 
task, and it requires today—as it did in the 1970s—a nuanced 
understanding of the roles played by both industry and government. 
Yet all of this begs the question: what about derivatives-related 
conduct that is not clearly tied to an exchange? During the 1970s, growth in 
the derivatives industry placed new market participants who were not 
members of any exchange into closer contact with the public.32 As non-
members of any exchange, these entities—such as futures commission 
merchants, commodity pool operators, and commodity trading advisors— 
“created a widening gap in the regulatory structure.”33 
The solution to these system gaps arrived in the form of the National 
 
 28 Hearings on S. 2109 Before the Subcomm. on Agricultural Research and General 
Legislation of the Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, 97th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 42 (1982), quoted by Jeffrey W. Markham, CFTC deference to self-regulation, 13A 
COMMODITIES REG. § 26:4 (Mar. 2020). 
 29 H.R. REP. 99-624, 7-8, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6005, 6008. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See, e.g., Mark, supra note 11, at 458 (“Self-regulation differs from pure private 
ordering in part [because it] entails government agencies such as the CFTC . . . imposing 
formalities for the adoption or amendment of rules, policies, and procedures.”). 
 32 See Roth, supra note 3. 
 33 Id. 
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Futures Association (NFA), a registered futures association with self-
regulatory authority over its members.34 Before describing the particular 
role of the NFA in modern derivatives markets, a brief contextual 
discussion of the relevant statutory provision is necessary. 
B. Section 21 of the Commodity Exchange Act 
The CFTC is authorized to designate registered futures associations 
pursuant to Section 21 of title III of the Commodity Exchange Act (Act), 
which sets forth standards for registration, such as that the association be 
“in the public interest” and provide formalized rules for association 
membership and member conduct.35 Section 21 is the genesis of the NFA—
the only registered futures association—and plays a central role in the rich 
self-regulatory history of the U.S. derivatives markets. In particular, Section 
21 provides a statutory basis for implementing the modern self-regulatory 
system of direct member regulation by associations that are themselves 
subject to oversight by the CFTC. 
This arrangement was designed intentionally and is reflected in the 
legislative history of Section 21. For instance, in describing the need to 
establish a protocol for registering futures associations under CFTC 
oversight, one senator explained that the NFA and other associations were 
important “for the purpose of self-regulating the practices of their 
members.”36 As a House of Representatives conference report noted, 
“[s]uch authority could only be exercised if approved by the Commission, 
and only if the association has met the requirements of title III.”37 
CFTC oversight over the NFA has manifested itself in numerous ways 
under Section 21 of the Act. For example, no futures association can 
become registered with the CFTC “unless the Commission finds, under 
standards established by the Commission,” that the association satisfies 
CFTC-defined registration requirements. Once a futures association is 
registered with the CFTC, the agency is empowered by the Act “to abrogate 
any rule of the registered futures association” if the agency deems that 
doing so is, among other things, necessary to “effectuate the purposes” of 
Section 21.38 
The CFTC may also make written requests to an association to “adopt 
any specified alteration or supplement to its rules” concerning the broad 
 
 34 The legislative history of the Act draws the distinction as follows: “exchanges are 
charged with important self-regulatory responsibilities over the members’ trading activities. 
Similarly, the National Futures Association . . . performs many important regulatory duties 
relating to off-exchange functions and activities.” H.R. REP. 99-624, 7-8, 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6005, 6008. 
 35 7 U.S.C. § 21 (2018). 
 36 120 CONG. REC. S18864-18872, at S18869 (Oct. 10, 1974). 
 37 120 CONG. REC. H10247-10266, at H10248 (Oct. 9, 1974). 
 38 7 U.S.C. § 21(k)(1). 
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topics covered by Section 21.39 These and other examples demonstrate that 
in the delegation of regulatory authority by Congress to the CFTC and then 
from the CFTC to self-regulatory organizations, CFTC oversight provides 
built-in accountability measures to ensure that registered futures 
associations are fulfilling their duties to the markets and their members. 
As this section has described, self-regulation in the U.S. derivatives 
markets is a fundamental component of the regulatory structure. Since its 
formation, the CFTC has effectively partnered with both the exchanges and 
the NFA to promote sound regulation in the derivatives markets. While 
these and other SROs maintain primary responsibility for regulating the 
conduct of their members, the CFTC retains oversight of the SROs 
themselves, producing a system that balances self-regulation with federal 
efforts. 
C. The National Futures Association 
On September 22, 1981, the CFTC formally designated the Nationals 
Futures Association as a registered futures association under Section 21 of 
the Act, formalizing the NFA’s self-regulatory functions and placing them 
under CFTC oversight.40 This model of a registered association serving as a 
primary regulator under federal oversight was modeled on a similar 
construct from the securities industry.41 
After only a few years, Congress took notice not only of the NFA’s 
progress in providing self-regulatory support for the CFTC, but it is doing 
so in a fiscally responsible manner. An early House of Representatives 
Report lauds the NFA not only for its progress in building the self-
regulatory systems still in operation today, but also for financing its efforts 
through member dues, “to some extent lessening the pressure to increase 
appropriations for the Commission.”42 
The CFTC’s designation of NFA as a registered futures association 
allowed NFA to begin its work43 as a central component of self-regulation 
for the users of derivatives markets. Through authority delegated by the 
CFTC, the NFA manages the registration of diverse market participants 
including commodity pool operators, futures commission merchants, and 
commodity trading advisors. Moreover, after passage of the Dodd-Frank 
 
 39 7 U.S.C. § 21(k)(2). 
 40 NFA, About NFA, https://www.nfa.futures.org/about/index.html [hereinafter About 
the NFA]. The CEA establishes numerous registration and governance requirements for 
registered futures associations. See 7 U.S.C. § 21 (2019). 
 41 H.R. 13113 CONG. REC., H 2923, 2924 (Apr. 11, 1974) (describing the Act as 
“authoriz[ing] the establishment of an association of commodity dealers or persons 
registered under the Act similar to [the National Association of Securities Dealers] in the 
securities industry.” (Rep. Poage). 
 42 H.R. Rep. No. 99-624, at 6009 (1986). 
 43 NFA’s self-regulatory efforts began in 1982. Id. 
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Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“the Dodd-Frank Act”)44 
in 2010, the NFA’s oversight extended to swap dealers and major swap 
participants.45 In handling registration and other matters “[o]n behalf of the 
CFTC,”46 the NFA is a key partner in fulfilling the CFTC’s statutory 
obligation to implement the Act. All told, the NFA today is responsible for 
seven broad categories of self-regulation that complement the CFTC’s 
oversight role.47 To take one example, the CFTC delegated the job of 
managing the Act’s registration requirements to the NFA.48 Today, the 
NFA manages more than 45,000 discrete registrations, as set forth in the 
chart below:49  
 
NFA Membership Category Registrations 
Commodity Trading Advisors 1,362 
Commodity Pool Operators 1,251 
Futures Commission Merchants 61 
Introducing Brokers 1,051 
Retail Foreign Exchange Dealers 4 




The importance of SROs in the functioning of the U.S. derivatives 
 
 44 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 45 See NFA, NFA Members, https://www.nfa.futures.org/members/index.html 
[hereinafter NFA, NFA Members]. Like the CFTC, the NFA’s responsibilities greatly 
expanded following passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. See, e.g., John Okray & Rachel V. 
Rose, Interview with Jonathan Marcus, General Counsel of the U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, 63 FED. LAW. 72, 74 (Dec. 2016) (quoting Jonathan Marcus as saying, 
“[s]ince the passage of Dodd-Frank, . . . the [CFTC] has delegated significant additional 
responsibility to the NFA. For example, the NFA now helps resolve valuation disputes, and 
the NFA receives data directly from [swap data repositories] to support its market 
supervision and compliance functions.”). 
 46 NFA, NFA Members, supra note 45. 
 47 In broad terms, the NFA is responsible for (1) managing CFTC registration; (2) 
developing rules for NFA members that are subject to CFTC approval; (3) enforcement of 
NFA rules; (4) regulating swap dealers through registration and compliance examinations; 
(5) swap execution facility (SEF) surveillance, which the NFA conducts pursuant to 
contracts with various SEFs; (6) arbitration of customer disputes with NFA members; (7) 
educational outreach to customers and NFA members. Roth, supra note 3. 
 48 See, e.g., id. 
 49 NFA, Membership and Directories, https://www.nfa.futures.org/registration-
membership/membership-and-directories.html. Note that the figures in the chart refer to 
discrete registrations rather than entities. An entity could, for example, be registered as both 
a commodity trading advisor and a commodity pool operator. There were 3,298 discrete 
entities registered with the NFA during the same period. 
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markets is made ever clearer when considering examinations of market 
participants. While the CFTC has a critical role in directly overseeing and 
conducting examinations of clearinghouses, SROs are responsible for the 




Market Participant Examinations (2015-2020)50 
 
 CFTC NFA CME 
CTA 0 1,500  
CPO 0 1,300  
FCM 0 150 259 
IB 0 1,100  
RFED 0 20  
SD 0 270  
CCP 21 0  
MISC. 0 0 46 
TOTAL 21 4,340 305 
 
Among its many self-regulatory responsibilities, the NFA establishes 
binding rules for members and is engaged in creating industry best 
practices.51 Violations of the NFA Rulebook are addressed by enforcement 
actions that the NFA can bring against its members.52 Through these efforts 
and more, the NFA has long served as “a reliable partner” to the CFTC, 
advancing efforts to mitigate systemic risk and curtail fraud and abuse.53 
 
 50 All data expressed in this chart is on file with the author. For the NFA column, 
entities that are registered in multiple capacities will be counted in every category in which 
they are registered. For example, a CTA that is also registered as a CPO will be counted 
once as a CTA and once as a CPO. Entities in the “Misc.” category fall within one or more 
of the other categories but are expressed only as “Misc.” to protect the confidentiality of 
certain information. 
 51 About the NFA, supra note 40. 
 52 See NFA, Enforcement and Registration Actions, https://www.nfa.futures.org/news/ 
EnforceRegActionsSimple.aspx. 
 53 See, e.g., Okray & Rose, supra note 45, at 74 (interview with former CFTC General 
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The NFA’s work in these areas effectively complements, without 
displacing, the CFTC’s efforts. 
II. ADVANTAGES OF SELF-REGULATION 
Self-regulation54 offers many advantages to regulated industries, the 
government, and taxpayers. This section will discuss why self-regulation 
can be superior to traditional government regulation in appropriate 
circumstances. 
A. Cost Savings to Taxpayers 
A key reason to favor self-regulation is that it can often achieve 
regulatory goals while reducing costs. SROs such as the NFA are typically 
funded by the regulated industry, freeing up taxpayer resources for other 
measures.55 As a report by the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) explains, an SRO structure “can result in substantial 
cost savings to the government, because those regulatory costs are largely 
shifted to the regulated industry.”56 Even where government regulators 
oversee and monitor SRO compliance with statutes and regulations, “the 
costs to government are probably less than they would be if government 
took on the bulk of regulatory responsibilities.”57 Hence, government cost 
savings obtained through the SRO structure are effectively passed down to 
taxpayers who would otherwise finance the costs of regulation.58 
 
Counsel Jonathan Marcus). 
 54 While this article focuses on SROs, a brief point should be made about designated 
self-regulatory organizations (DSROs). When an entity is subject to more than one SRO, the 
SROs are permitted to determine among themselves which one will be the “designated” 
regulator of the entity. A plan is then submitted to the CFTC, which can approve, modify, or 
reject the plan. See CFTC, Futures Glossary, Designated Self-Regulatory Organization 
(DSRO), https://www.cftc.gov/LearnAndProtect/EducationCenter/CFTCGlossary/glossary_ 
d.html. 
 55 See NFA, Funding, https://www.nfa.futures.org/about/funding.html. 
 56 IOSCO, SRO Consultive Committee, Model for Effective Regulation (May 2000) at 
12, available at https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD110.pdf. See also 
Emily Hammond, Double Deference in Administrative Law, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1705, 1718 
(2016) (“Put frankly, today’s major oversight agencies could not themselves assume the 
responsibilities of their SROs without extraordinary increases in their staffing and 
budgets.”). 
 57 Margot Priest, The Privatization of Regulation: Five Models of Self-Regulation, 29 
OTTAWA L. REV. 233, 270 (1997). 
 58 See, e.g., former CFTC Commissioner Walter Lukken, Reauthorization: Let the 
Debate Begin, 24 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. 1 (2004) (“there are significant potential 
savings to the taxpayer in having the [derivatives] industry regulate itself.”); see also Natalie 
Stoeckl, The Private Costs and Benefits of Environmental Self-Regulation: Which Firms 
Have Most to Gain?, 13 BUS. STRATEGY ENV’T 135,136 (2004); see also Marianne K. 
Smythe, Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry and the Antitrust 
Laws: Suggestions for an Accommodation, 62 N.C.L. Rev. 475, 475 (1984). 
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B. Consistent and Sustainable Financing 
While fiscally appealing, the SRO self-financing model can also 
produce discernable improvements in regulation. The first relates to the 
implementation challenges of legislating large-scale regulatory efforts, and 
of sustaining adequate levels of financing for them over time. Legislators 
may justifiably be “reluctant to spend taxpayers’ money to finance 
ambitious regulatory plans[.]”59 Accordingly, shifting costs to regulated 
industries can sidestep “the political considerations that surround” financing 
and budgets, “effectively ensuring that significant resources will be utilized 
for supervising the [regulated] industry.”60 Predictability is also improved, 
as “[i]ndustry funding . . . provides greater certainty regarding the timing 
and availability of funding and thus greater ability to make capital 
investments in longer-term initiatives.”61 In short, SRO financing can avoid 
the problems of fiscal wrangling and budget cuts. 
There is also an argument that SRO self-financing improves the 
quality of regulation. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) 
CEO Robert Cook has argued that under the SRO self-financing model, 
“[t]he industry bears the cost of its own supervision, which alleviates the 
need for even larger governmental expenditures for this purpose. This 
funding can lead to heightened supervision.”62 Using FINRA as an 
example, Cook explained that “the SRO model has resulted in a regulatory 
regime in which every broker-dealer member of [FINRA]” is subject to 
recurrent compliance examinations and application approval.63 The key 
point is that self-regulation can scale with industry—as a regulated market 
expands, so too does SRO financing. This is not necessarily the case with 
government funding, which may not increase as regulated markets grow. 
On this issue, for example, the CFTC offers a case in point. While the 
CFTC’s jurisdiction was first extended to swaps following the Dodd-Frank 
Act,64 and more recently to certain conduct involving digital assets,65 the 
agency’s funding has only modestly grown.66 
 
 59 Stavros Gadinis & Howell E. Jackson, Markets As Regulators: A Survey, 80 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1239, 1250–51 (2007). 
 60 Id. at 1251. 
 61 Robert Cook, Why do we need self-regulator organizations? – Cook, 
INVESTMENTNEWS (April 2, 2017), https://www.investmentnews.com/why-do-we-need-self-
regulatory-organizations-cook-71012. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 65 The CFTC has enforcement jurisdiction over fraud and manipulation in connection 
with digital assets. See, e.g., CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 217 (E.D.N.Y. 
2018); see also CFTC v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d 492, 495-98 (D. Mass. 
2018). 
 66 For example, the CFTC requested a budget of $168 million in 2010 and $216 million 
in 2011, the first year following passage of the Dodd-Frank Act and the beginning of the 
CFTC’s oversight over the multi-trillion-dollar U.S. swaps markets. COMMODITY FUTURES 
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C. Knowledge and Expertise 
Industry knowledge and expertise are additional reasons to favor 
self-regulation. Many regulated industries are highly specialized and 
demand significant levels of expertise to manage them effectively. While 
the dedicated civil servants who staff our government agencies can and do 
obtain this expertise, drawing from industry knowledge offers additional 
insight that can improve regulatory outcomes both for SROs and the 
government. As one scholar has argued, “[p]rivate organizations are by 
their nature composed of individuals or groups with an interest in and 
knowledge of the subject area around which they are organized. This makes 
them useful repositories of expertise to which government regulators can 
turn.”67 As organizations composed of industry members, SROs have their 
finger on the pulse of industry and can often obtain accurate information 
more quickly than their government counterparts can. 
It is difficult to overstate the value of industry expertise to regulatory 
systems. As some scholars have posited, “[p]erhaps the greatest single 
benefit that self-regulation possesses over other forms of regulation is its 
access to direct industry expertise.”68 This is particularly true when 
regulated industries are fast-moving or digitizing—such as modern 
derivatives markets.69 Drawing from industry experts can also have the 
effect of reducing the costs of regulating, both by improving process 
efficiency and avoiding unnecessary or duplicative measures.70 
Among other things, SROs like the NFA publish rules and conduct 
standards that bind members. Drawing from specialized knowledge helps 
ensure that these efforts are effective and well-tailored. In addition, the 
NFA frequently shares information with the CFTC regarding developments 
in the market, issues of regulatory concern to its members, and violations of 
CFTC rules. The NFA even proposes rulemakings to the CFTC—ensuring 
that the technical knowledge of NFA members is considered by regulators 
as the markets evolve.71 
 
TRADING COMM’N, PRESIDENT’S BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE PLAN, FISCAL YEAR 2011 
(2010), 
https://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/cftcbudget2011.pdf. 
 67 Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory 
Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 181 (1995). 
 68 William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth Branch, 99 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1, 55 (2013). 
 69 Id. (arguing that “[A] financial SRO can enjoy a greater degree of information and 
experience regarding the way in which financial transactions are actually performed in 
today’s incredibly sophisticated and specialized economy.”). 
 70 See Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1929, 1967 
(2017) (“[S]elf-regulation leverages the technical expertise and knowledge of the industry to 
craft a high-quality, efficient, and effective system of rules and regulations for the industry. 
Indeed, reliance on industry experts to design and implement the rules should result in 
lowered costs and increased benefits for the regulated industry.”). 
 71 See NFA, Rule Submission to the CFTC, https://www.nfa.futures.org/news/newsRule 
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The expertise and knowledge of SROs are often reflected in CFTC 
rulemakings. A recent example is the final rule on speculative position 
limits for derivatives, which the CFTC finalized in October 2020. Generally 
speaking, position limits determine the size of speculative derivatives 
positions a trader may hold in a particular commodity.72 The CFTC 
establishes the “ceiling” of speculative position limits, while exchanges can 
apply further levels as necessary to help prevent manipulative conduct such 
as corners and squeezes.73 Position limits do not apply to bona fide hedging 
transactions.74 
In the final position limits rule, the CFTC called for enhanced 
cooperation between the agency and exchanges, as the latter have 
“obligations to carry out self-regulatory responsibilities, resources, deep 
knowledge of their markets and trading practices, close interactions with 
market participants, [and] existing programs for addressing [position limit] 
exemption requests, and direct ability to leverage these resources to 
generally act more quickly than the Commission[.]”75 
Among other efforts, exchanges can capitalize on their deep 
knowledge of the derivatives markets and closeness to market participants 
to provide the CFTC with deliverable supply information for commodities 
underlying futures contracts, recommend position limit levels to the CFTC, 
and “help administer the program for recognizing bona fide hedges.”76 
An example is the process for addressing requests for non-enumerated 
bona fide hedging positions.77 Under the final position limits rule, market 
participants can submit one application to an exchange to request a non-
enumerated bona fide hedge, and receive approval of such request for the 
purposes of both exchange-set limits and federal limits, provided the CFTC 
does not intervene within a ten-business-day review period (or two business 
days in the case of sudden or unforeseen bona fide hedging needs) 
following the exchange approval.78 The new process leverages existing 
exchange processes, expertise, and resources while affording the 
Commission the opportunity to intervene as needed. 
In sum, the CFTC’s final position limits rule follows a self-regulatory 
framework that has been effective for decades: wide latitude for SRO 
efforts, subject to ultimate CFTC oversight. 
 
SubList.asp. 
 72 See Opening Statement of Chairman Heath P. Tarbert in Support of Final Rule on 
Position Limits, Nat’l Futures Ass’n (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/ 
SpeechesTestimony/tarbertstatement101520b. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Position Limits for Derivatives, 86 Fed. Reg. 3,236, 3,238 (Jan. 14, 2021). 
 76 Id. at 3,239. 
 77 A non-enumerated bona fide hedge is one that is not expressly identified in CFTC 
rules. 
 78 See Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 75, at 3,375-76. 
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D. Speed and Flexibility 
SROs are also advantageous because they can move quickly, which is 
especially useful during periods of rapid change or crisis. There are many 
good reasons why government rulemaking processes are generally slower 
than self-regulatory efforts: the Administrative Procedure Act is designed to 
ensure that federal agencies weigh costs and benefits, inform the public of 
what they are doing, and seek industry feedback before finalizing rules.79 
Nonetheless, there are situations that require flexible, quick responses,80 
and SROs are often best-able to meet this need.81 
For example, in describing its supervision rules, the NFA notes that it 
“expects that Members’ supervisory programs will vary, and NFA’s policy 
is to provide firms with the flexibility to develop and implement procedures 
that are tailored to their operations.”82 While governments can also provide 
flexible solutions—particularly when applying principles-based 
regulation83—SROs often have more procedural freedom to do so. As an 
IOSCO report concluded, “[a] product of the experience and expertise of 
self-regulatory bodies is their ability to modify their rules in response to 
changes taking place in the industry more readily than government 
agencies.”84 “In many jurisdictions”—including the United States—“the 
more rigid requirements typically imposed on the rulemaking process of 
statutory regulators does not allow [them] to react as quickly to changes 
taking place in the financial services industry.”85 This combination of 
industry expertise and fast adaptability allows SROs to pivot quickly to new 
focus areas and concerns. As will be seen, this ability to mobilize and adjust 
can greatly assist in responding to fast-moving market crises. 
E. More Trust by Market Participants 
SROs can also provide a trust advantage because they are composed 
 
 79 See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1521, 1605 (2005) (explaining that the Administrative Procedures Act “was designed to 
promote transparency and prevent arbitrary, capricious acts that amount to an abuse of 
discretion.”). 
 80 Federal agencies have the option of using interim final rules, which provide final rules 
before a formal public comment period. Interim final rules can produce faster rulemakings, 
but they are rarely used and require certain legal conditions. See, e.g., Michael 
Asimow, Interim-Final Rules: Making Haste Slowly, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 703, 748 (1999). 
 81 See IOSCO, supra note 56, at 3 (“SROs by their very nature have greater flexibility to 
adapt regulatory requirements to a rapidly changing business environment.”). 
 82 NFA, Supervision, https://www.nfa.futures.org/members/ib/regulatory-obligations/ 
supervision.html. 
 83 See Heath P. Tarbert, Rules for Principles and Principles for Rules: Tools for 
Crafting Sound Financial Regulation, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2020) [hereinafter Tarbert, 
Principles]. 
 84 IOSCO, supra note 56, at 6. 
 85 Id. 
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of, and subject to direct insight from, regulated entities. Empirical research 
has shown that building the trust of regulated entities into the regulatory 
process can lead to better policy outcomes, as participants become vested in 
a program’s success.86 By gaining the trust of their members and listening 
to their concerns, SROs “should enhance the willingness of members to 
adhere to a set of standards” provided by the SRO.87 In short, “self-
regulation may result in better compliance with rules because it may be 
more easily accepted by the regulated parties.”88 
In fact, higher levels of trust or “buy in” from regulated entities have 
translated into higher levels of regulatory compliance by SRO members in 
certain circumstances. An Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) report determined that: 
Compliance with self-regulatory mechanisms . . . can, in some cases, 
be stronger [than with government regulation] due to the benefits of buy-in 
by industry members who may have helped design them and who may thus 
have a vested interest in their success (Priest, 1998). The degree of 
commitment engendered by industry control may also be beneficial for 
consumers, as it may in some cases encourage businesses to “raise the bar” 
and reach higher standards (OFT, 2009).89 
Industry “buy in” is possible through the SRO structure because SRO-
crafted rules “are perceived by the regulated entities, because of their own 
participation, as more ‘reasonable’ from the outset compared with the more 
inflexible counterparts issued by government regulators.”90 In applying a 
criminal law analogy, one group of scholars explained of self-regulation: 
“[a]s any prosecutor knows, it is far easier to negotiate with and to monitor 
 
 86 See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 
652 (2000) (discussing a study demonstrating “that merely enlisting private actors in self-
regulation can enhance trust among them, which in turn contributes to the program’s chance 
of success”). 
 87 CTR. FOR FIN. MKT. INTEGRITY, SELF-REGULATION IN TODAY’S SECURITIES MARKETS: 
OUTDATED SYSTEM OR WORK IN PROGRESS? 5 (2007), https://www.cfainstitute.org/-
/media/documents/article/position-paper/self-regulation-in-todays-securities-markets-
outdated-system-or-work-in-progress.ashx. See also SEC. EXCH. COMM’N., Rel. No. 34-
50700, File No. S7-40-04, CONCEPT RELEASE CONCERNING SELF-REGULATION, (Mar. 8, 
2005), https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/34-50700.htm (explaining that in the SRO context, 
“industry participants preferred the less invasive regulation by their peers to direct 
government regulation and the government benefited by being able to leverage its resources 
through its oversight of self-regulatory organizations”). 
 88 Speech of Karen K. Wuertz, Senior Vice President, Strategic Planning and 
Communications, Nat’l Futures Ass’n, “Model for Effective Self-Regulation,” presented at 
IOSCO Conference, Sydney, Australia, (May 19, 2000). https://www.iosco.org/library/ 
annual_conferences/pdf/ac25-25.pdf. 
 89 ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV. PUBL’G PARIS, DIGITAL ECONOMY PAPERS, 
NO. 247, INDUSTRY SELF REGULATION: ROLE AND USE IN SUPPORTING CONSUMER INTERESTS 
19 (Jan. 3, 2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5js4k1fjqkwh-en. 
 90 Michael, supra note 67, at 183. 
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the actions of parties who share a degree of trust.”91 In the SRO context, 
this dynamic leads to improved compliance because the particular rules of 
the SRO are “recognized as consistent with and not impairing or opposing 
the [regulated] entity’s goals.”92 Suffice it to say, it is considerably more 
difficult for a government agency, such as the CFTC, to promulgate 
regulations that are perceived by market participants to be inherently 
reasonable and free from political bias. 
F. Swifter Enforcement 
Building on the prior advantages of self-regulation, the SRO structure 
can also efficiently and effectively resolve violations of SRO rules. While 
the CFTC remains primarily responsible for addressing violations of the 
Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC regulations, SROs play an important 
role in reducing misconduct in the markets. SROs such as exchanges and 
the NFA and registered derivatives exchange engage in self-enforcement of 
their rules, wielding a potentially devastating consequence: the possibility 
of being ejected from the SRO and effectively barred from the markets.93 
There are many reasons to prefer enforcement by SROs in appropriate 
circumstances. First, self-enforcement by SROs limits government 
enforcement expenditures, allowing regulatory goals like position-limits 
compliance and non-manipulation to be achieved without costly litigation 
by government regulators in federal courts. As described above, 
transferring such costs to SROs provides a float-down effect that saves 
taxpayers money without compromising regulatory goals such as 
transparency, price discovery, and fair markets. 
Second, SRO-based enforcement actions are effective for the same 
reason as SRO rules are: they are supported by industry expertise and buy-
in.94 Having come together to construct the rules of the game through an 
SRO, regulated members often have little tolerance for those who break the 
rules. That prudent degree of tolerance is grounded in practicality—if SROs 
fail to police conduct adequately, the predictable consequence will be 
greater government intervention. 
Third, SRO enforcement can operate collaboratively and in parallel 
with government enforcement efforts. Many significant CFTC enforcement 
actions, as well as criminal prosecutions by the Department of Justice and 
 
 91 Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 68, at 56. 
 92 Michael, supra note 67, at 183-84. 
 93 See Roth, supra note 3 (“If violations [of NFA rules] are noted, the offending firm is 
subject to a disciplinary process which can result in the firm being expelled from NFA. 
Given the mandatory nature of NFA’s membership, firms that are expelled from NFA are 
effectively barred from the futures industry.”). 
 94 See Wuertz, supra note 88 (asserting, in the context of derivatives market 
development, that “[i]ndustry participants recognized that those who were most familiar with 
the customs and practices of a particular trade were best suited to create rules related to that 
trade, to enforce those rules and to resolve the disputes that arose from those rules.”). 
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other law enforcement agencies, begin with SRO referrals.95 This dynamic 
is not just good for overall enforcement, but it transfers some of the 
detection burden from government regulators such as the CFTC to industry 
participants who are adept at identifying misconduct.96 
Last, SROs provide valuable assistance with enforcing CFTC 
settlements and court-awarded judgments. An important function of the 
NFA in particular is to assist the CFTC in collecting restitution and 
disgorged funds. The NFA also works to ensure that recovered funds are 
provided to victims of fraud and misconduct. In addition, the NFA often 
acts as a monitor for registered entities subject to compliance and audit 
undertakings as a condition for resolving CFTC enforcement matters.97 
G. Responsible Innovation 
The derivatives markets are fast-moving and rapidly digitalizing. New 
products and trends such as digital assets, algorithmic trading of futures and 
options, and reforms in the use of data to monitor the swaps markets are 
just a few examples of the ever-growing influence of technology.98 While 
the CFTC retains the ultimate authority over these issues, SROs play an 
important role in fostering and responding to innovation in the markets. 
SROs are able to respond to new market conditions with speed and 
flexibility, which is important during periods of innovation. SROs in 
 
 95 See, e.g., COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, DIV. OF ENF’T, ENFORCEMENT 
MANUAL 8 (May 20, 2020), https://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/Enforcement/ 
EnforcementManual.pdf (explaining that when SROs “discover potentially illegal activities 
that fall outside the scope of their regulatory authority or that also violates the CEA or 
[CFTC] Regulations, they may refer such activities to the [CFTC Division of 
Enforcement.]”); see also Roth, supra note 3 (“NFA regularly meets with the CFTC and 
with law enforcement officials to refer violations noted by NFA for criminal prosecutions.”). 
 96 See, e.g., COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, supra note 95 at 8. (“NFA 
administers its own disciplinary program for violations of its rules by its members, and may 
refer information to the [CFTC Division of Enforcement] regarding potential violations of 
the CEA and the [CFTC’s] Regulations.”). 
 97 Final Judgment and Order of Perm. Injunction, Disgorgement, Restitution, and Civ. 
Money Penalties, CFTC v. Reisinger, Case No. 1:11-cv-08567 *5-6 n.2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 
2017) (“NFA routinely serves as a monitor in CFTC enforcement actions . . . . NFA 
processes and administers post-judgment restitution payments . . . .”). 
 98 See Statement of Chairman Heath P. Tarbert in Support of Interpretive Guidance on 
Actual Delivery for Digital Assets (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/ 
SpeechesTestimony/tarbertstatement032420a (describing the development of digital assets 
and stating, “it is critically important that the United States continue to be a leader in 
blockchain technology. Under my leadership, the CFTC will continue to do its part to 
encourage innovation through sound regulation.”); see also Statement of Chairman Heath P. 
Tarbert in Support of the Proposed Rule on Electronic Trading Risk Principles (June 25, 
2020), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/tarbertstatement062520b 
(discussing changes in automated derivatives trading and state, “[t]he markets exist to serve 
the needs of market participants, not the regulator. If a technological change improves the 
functioning of the markets, we should embrace it.”) [hereinafter Tarbert, Statement in 
Support of the Proposed rule on Electronic Trading Risk Principles]. 
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particular are adept at applying principles-based regulation to developing 
scenarios.99 As I have written previously, principles-based regulation “can 
facilitate the development of new business models, products, and internal 
processes.”100 Moreover, “[p]rinciples-based regulation thus encourages 
market innovation, which is central to economic growth and prosperity.”101 
To take one recent example, the CFTC recently proposed a principles-
based approach to risk principles for electronic trading.102 In that proposal, 
the CFTC recognized that risk principles for electronic trading is an area 
“where regulated entities have greater understanding than the regulator 
about the risks they face and greater knowledge about how to address those 
risks.”103 The result is that the exchanges need flexibility in how to address 
electronic trading risks. Already, exchanges provide tailored risk-control 
systems to help traders mitigate their exposure to credit, market, and other 
risks.104 Providing exchanges with the same operational freedom for 
mitigating the risks of electronic trading is both sensible and likely to 
produce optimal regulatory outcomes. 
III. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
Although self-regulation has many advantages, it is most effective 
when backed up by traditional governmental regulation. This section will 
address the CFTC’s vital role in derivatives regulation, focusing on how the 
agency buttresses the self-regulatory regiment. The section concludes with 
additional roles played by the agency that only a government entity can 
undertake. In short, the government can and should play a unique role in 
financial regulation, particularly where the advantages lie in its favor. The 
recipe for sound regulation therefore is the proper blending of self-
regulation with government regulation. 
A. Oversight 
The most important function of federal agencies with respect to SROs 
is that of oversight. Government oversight of SROs is the key 
distinguishing factor between the SRO system and other forms of private 
regulation.105 As an IOSCO report has explained, “Government oversight is 
 
 99 See, e.g., Tarbert, Principles, supra note 83, at 6, 14 (describing the role of SROs in 
performing principles-based regulation). 
 100 Id. at 8. 
 101 Id. 
 102 See Tarbert, Statement in Support of the Proposed rule on Electronic Trading Risk 
Principles, supra note 98. 
 103 Id. 
 104 See, e.g., Cboe, Risk Management Tools, https://markets.cboe.com/us/options/trading/ 
risk_management/; see also CME, CME Global Credit Controls (GC2), https:// 
www.cmegroup.com/tools-information/webhelp/globex-credit-controls/Content/CME-
Globex-Credit-Controls-Management.html. 
 105 See Hammond, supra note 56, at 1711 (“The agency’s oversight role distinguishes 
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an essential element in the self-regulatory structure.”106 This is the case for 
a variety of reasons, most notably to ensure accountability and provide “a 
system of checks and balances.”107 Just as pure governmental regulation 
raises questions about resource adequacy, flexibility, and whether industry 
voices are being heard, pure private ordering puts at risk accountability and 
public faith in the regulatory framework.108 Oversight by public regulators 
is designed in part to ensure the success of SROs by shoring up 
accountability and preserving public trust in the SRO structure.109 
The key challenge with respect to public trust is the possibility of 
conflicts of interest.110 As members of industry, SROs raise the proverbial 
fox-in-the-henhouse question: does the SRO really protect the interests of 
the public, or is it beholden only to its industry stakeholders?111 Concern 
about an inherent “conflict of interest that exists when an organization both 
serves the commercial interests of and regulates its members” has been 
long-standing.112 The imposition of government oversight to help ensure 
that SROs perform their self-regulatory duties faithfully is an effective way 
to address this concern. 
Calibrating the appropriate level of oversight is not always easy. As an 
IOSCO report explains, “[o]ne of the biggest challenges that government 
faces . . . is to provide an appropriate level of government oversight of SRO 
activities without encumbering or usurping an SRO’s ability to respond 
quickly and flexibly to changing market conditions and business needs.”113 
Fortunately, the Commodity Exchange Act provides a detailed statutory 
scheme that assists the CFTC in striking the appropriate balance. 
 
SROs from voluntary or purely private self-regulatory efforts.”). 
 106 IOSCO, supra note 56, at 8. 
 107 Id. 
 108 See Yueh-Ping (Alex) Yang & Cheng-Yun Tsang, RegTech and the New Era of 
Financial Regulators: Envisaging More Public-Private-Partnership Models of Financial 
Regulators, 21 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 354, 389-90 (2018). 
 109 Id. 
 110 See, e.g., former SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, The Need for Robust SEC 
Oversight over SROs (May 8, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/2013-
spch050813laahtm (“Because of the inherent conflict of interests involved in self-regulation, 
robust SEC oversight over SROs is indispensable.”). 
 111 See, e.g., Daniel Castro, Benefits and Limitations of Industry Self-Regulation for 
Online Behavioral Advertising, THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION 
FOUNDATION (Dec. 2011) at 9, https://itif.org/files/2011-self-regulation-online-behavioral-
advertising.pdf (“Some critics see self-regulation as putting the fox in charge of the hen 
house . . . . Rather than operating in the public interest, critics may assume that SROs 
operate purely to protect the interests of individual firms or the industry as a whole.”). 
 112 Joel Seligman, Should Investment Companies Be Subject to a New Statutory Self-
Regulatory Organization?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1115, 1117 (2005) (quoting SEC Concept 
Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exch. Act Rel. No. 50,700, 84 SEC Docket 619, 620 
(Nov. 18, 2004)). 
 113 IOSCO, supra note 56, at 3. 
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1. Futures Associations 
CFTC oversight of registered futures associations—in practice, only 
the NFA114—begins at formation and extends through disciplinary 
measures and rulemakings. The genesis of the CFTC’s oversight over 
futures associations begins with Section 17 of the Act,115 the requirements 
of which are further detailed in Part 170 of the CFTC’s regulations.116 
Section 17(a) begins by requiring CFTC approval before any futures 
association can be formed. Formation requires, among other things, the 
submission to the CFTC of a registration statement that provides data 
concerning the prospective association’s “organization, membership, and 
rules of procedures.”117 The CFTC “shall not register an applicant” unless 
the conditions of registration are satisfied.118 
To become registered, a prospective association must be found by the 
CFTC to be “in the public interest” and able to comply with CFTC rules.119 
Notably, a futures association is required to “demonstrate that it will require 
its members to adhere to regulatory requirements governing their business 
practices at least as stringent as those imposed by the Commission.”120 
From the outset, this requirement ensures that registered futures 
associations do not apply a “light-touch” regulatory approach that would be 
less effective than direct CFTC regulation. 
Futures associations registered with the CFTC must promote fairness 
and limit the risk of misconduct by restricting association access to 
qualified persons who have not previously been suspended or expelled from 
the NFA or a similar futures association.121 These requirements can be 
modified at CFTC direction in furtherance of the public interest.122 
CFTC oversight also extends to futures association rules. Among other 
requirements, association rules must be designed “to prevent fraudulent and 
manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of 
trade,” “to protect the public interest,” and “to remove impediments to and 
perfect the mechanism of free and open futures trading.”123 Requirements 
for customer protection and ethical standards for dealing with customers 
 
 114 While the NFA is the only registered futures association, this section often addresses 
“registered futures associations” generally. This has been done to accurately capture the text 
and meaning of the Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC regulations, even though in 
practice the provisions relating to registered futures associations apply only to the NFA. 
 115 7 U.S.C. § 21 (2018). 
 116 17 C.F.R. § 170 (2020). 
 117 7 U.S.C. § 21(a)(1). 
 118 17 C.F.R. § 170.9; 7 U.S.C. § 21(f). 
 119 7 U.S.C. § 21(b)(1). 
 120 17 C.F.R. § 170.1 (emphasis added). 
 121 7 U.S.C. § 21(b)(2). 
 122 7 U.S.C. §§ 21(b)(3), (4). 
 123 7 U.S.C. § 21(b)(7). 
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have also been added through CFTC regulations.124 Further, the CFTC 
retains oversight over new rulemakings by associations, and has the power 
“by order to abrogate any rule of a registered futures association” if 
“necessary or appropriate to assure fair dealing” by members, or “fair 
representation” of members.125 The CFTC may also request registered 
futures associations “to adopt any specified alteration or supplement to its 
rules” with respect to the requirements set forth in the Commodity 
Exchange Act.126 
Importantly, in crafting their rules, futures associations must ensure 
that members and persons associated with members “shall be appropriately 
disciplined, by expulsion, suspension, fine, [or] censure” from the 
association if they violate the association’s rules.127 This provision requires 
that futures associations act in the public interest by providing 
consequences for the breach of their own rules. Association disciplinary 
proceedings are subject to CFTC review to ensure fairness.128 In appropriate 
cases, the CFTC can even “set aside” disciplinary penalties, as well as 
remand them back to the futures association as necessary.129 These 
measures ensure that association disciplinary processes are “vigorous,” 
“consistent with the fundamental elements of due process,” and “[are] fair 
and [have] a reasonable basis in fact.”130 
Two final oversight mechanisms are especially important. First, the 
CFTC retains the power to suspend or withdraw the registration of any 
registered futures association. These consequences can be triggered if the 
CFTC determines that the association has violated the Commodity 
Exchange Act or CFTC rules, “has failed to enforce compliance with its 
own rules, or has engaged in any other activity tending to defeat the 
purpose of [Section 17 of the Act].”131 Suspension or revocation of 
registration is the ultimate sanction to ensure that registered futures 
associations remain well-functioning and accountable. 
Second, Congress retains an external, oversight function over 
registered futures associations as well as the CFTC itself. The Commodity 
Exchange Act requires that the CFTC, in its annual reports to Congress, 
 
 124 17 C.F.R. § 170.5 (2020) provides in part: 
A futures association must establish and maintain a program for the protection of customers 
and option customers, including the adoption of rules to protect customers and option 
customers and customer funds and to promote fair dealing with the public. These rules shall 
set forth the ethical standards for members of the association in their business dealings with 
the public. 
 125 7 U.S.C. § 21(k)(1). 
 126 7 U.S.C. § 21(k)(2). 
 127 7 U.S.C. § 21(b)(8). 
 128 7 U.S.C. §§ 21(h), (i)(1)(B). 
 129 7 U.S.C. § 21(i)(1)(B). 
 130 17 C.F.R. § 170.6 (2020). 
 131 7 U.S.C. § 21(l)(1). 
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“include . . . information concerning any futures associations registered” 
under Section 17 of that statute.132 The CFTC must also annually report to 
Congress on “the effectiveness of such associations in regulating the 
practices of the members.”133 This second requirement in particular creates 
incentives both for futures associations to act appropriately, as well as for 
the CFTC to monitor their activities closely. A congressional backstop also 
creates an external accountability measure separate from the association or 
the CFTC, thereby limiting the risk of conflicts of interest. 
2. Exchanges 
The CFTC also retains oversight over derivatives exchanges, which 
are registered as “designated contract markets” under Section 5 of the 
Commodity Exchange Act and Part 38 of the CFTC’s regulations.134 More 
recently, the CFTC was given authority to register swap execution facilities 
(SEFs), which are somewhat analogous to exchanges that allow the trading 
of swaps. There is a similar but distinct regulatory oversight role of SEFs, 
but they do not typically function as self-regulatory organizations. 
As with futures associations, the CFTC retains the authority to approve 
or reject the registration of an exchange, which is subject to certain 
requirements.135 Among other things, a registered exchange is required to 
comply with twenty-three “core principles,”136 as well as “any requirement 
that the Commission may impose by rule or regulation” under Section 
12a(5) of the Act, which provides the CFTC with broad discretion to 
establish “such rules and regulations as, in the judgment of the 
Commission, are reasonably necessary to effectuate” registration.137 
There are certain distinctions between the CFTC’s oversight of 
exchanges and its oversight of registered futures associations. First, while 
the CFTC primarily regulates registered futures associations as 
organizations with particular obligations both to their members and the 
public, the CFTC’s focus with respect to exchanges centers on the 
functioning of the derivatives markets themselves. In particular, CFTC 
oversight over exchanges is intended to provide for orderly markets by 
retaining oversight over market structure and trading activities. For 
example, the Commodity Exchange Act places on exchanges the 
responsibility “to prevent manipulation, price distortion, and disruptions of 
the delivery or cash-settlement process through market surveillance, 
 
 132 7 U.S.C. § 21(n). 
 133 Id. 
 134 7 U.S.C. § 7 (2018); 17 C.F.R. § 38 (2020). 
 135 7 U.S.C. § 7 (2018); 17 C.F.R. § 38.3(a) (2020) (providing CFTC process and 
requirements for exchange registration). 
 136 The twenty-three core principles can be viewed at Designated Contract Markets 
(DCMs), COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, https://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/ 
TradingOrganizations/DCMs/index.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2021). 
 137 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(1)(A); 7 U.S.C. § 12a(5). 
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compliance, and enforcement practices.”138 This is in addition to a 
requirement that exchanges only list for trading those contracts that “are not 
readily susceptible to manipulation.”139 Another goal is price discovery. In 
this regard, exchanges are legally required to “provide a competitive, open, 
and efficient market and mechanism for executing transactions that protects 
the price discovery process.”140 In sum, CFTC oversight over exchanges is 
designed to ensure that they are properly monitoring trading activities. 
The second notable feature of CFTC oversight of exchanges relates to 
how oversight occurs, which is primarily through core principles that apply 
to every exchange.141 Core principles are at the heart of self-regulation 
because they provide basic requirements while leaving exchanges with 
“reasonable discretion in establishing the manner in which the [exchange] 
complies.”142 Rather than applying prescriptive rules, the use of core 
principles to regulate exchanges is “designed to provide exchanges with 
more flexibility in their approaches to compliance through self-
regulation.”143 The CFTC’s Division of Market Oversight helps ensure that 
exchanges comply with the core principles by conducting regular rule 
enforcement reviews and examinations, which evaluate “the self-regulatory 
programs operated by the exchange[s] in order to enforce [CFTC] rules, 
prevent market manipulation and customer and market abuses, and ensure 
the recording and safe storage of trade information,” among other items.144 
The CFTC’s oversight over clearinghouses, also known as “derivatives 
clearing organizations,” is similar. Every exchange must have a relationship 
with a clearinghouse. Clearinghouses provide a critical function for the 
derivatives markets by standing between counterparties to clear and process 
trades that have been executed on exchanges. In this role, the clearinghouse 
mitigates counterparty credit risk.145 Some clearinghouses have been 
 
 138 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(4); 17 C.F.R. § 38.250 (2020) (Core Principle 4). 
 139 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(3); 17 C.F.R. § 38.200 (2020) (Core Principle 3). 
 140 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(9)(A); 17 C.F.R. § 38.500 (2020) (Core Principle 9). 
 141 An exchange must comply with the core principles in order “[t]o be designated, and 
maintain a designation, as a contract market.” 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(1)(A). See also 17 C.F.R. § 
38.100(a) (2020). 
 142 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(1)(B); 17 C.F.R. § 38.100(b) (2020). 
 143 Former CFTC Commissioner Thomas J. Erickson, Regulatory Uncertainty Under the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, 21 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. 6 
(2001). 
 144 Designated Contract Markets (DCMs), COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, 
https://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/TradingOrganizations/DCMs/index.htm (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2021). 
 145 See, e.g., Heath P. Tarbert, Statement of Chairman Heath P. Tarbert in Support of 
Final Rule on Alternative Compliance for Non-U.S. Clearinghouses, COMMODITY FUTURES 
TRADING COMM’N (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/ 
tarbertstatement091720; see also Derivatives Clearing Organizations, COMMODITY FUTURES 
TRADING COMM’N, https://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/ClearingOrganizations/ 
index.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2021). 
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designated systemically important for their critical role in the financial 
system.146 Clearinghouses operate as SROs but, like exchanges, are subject 
to broad CFTC oversight to ensure compliance with their own set of Core 
Principles.147 Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act further makes the CFTC 
responsible for conducting examinations of clearinghouses to ensure that 
they satisfy safety and soundness, financial resources, cyber resilience, and 
other important requirements.148 The CFTC also conducts “stress tests” of 
clearinghouses to help ensure they can withstand financial shocks.149 
B. Additional Agency Roles 
While oversight of SROs is the most central role of government in 
self-regulatory systems, there are additional situations where federal action 
is preferable. Without identifying every such case, this section will focus on 
several that are both timely and relevant to the CFTC’s role as the primary 
regulator of U.S. derivatives markets. 
1. Administrative Law Functions 
Only a federal agency can modify, rescind, or grant exemptive or no-
action relief from a federal regulation. While SROs self-regulate their 
members by passing rules, conducting exams, and bringing enforcement 
actions, they must nonetheless operate within the formal regulatory 
structure created by federal agencies in fulfilling their delegated mandates 
from Congress. SROs have flexibility to operate within this structure, but 
they are unable to change the structure itself. 
Second, only the CFTC as a federal agency can act as the final 
interpretive authority of the Commodity Exchange Act and the Core 
Principles thereunder, subject to judicial review. While SROs retain 
flexibility to implement Core Principles and related requirements, the 
CFTC must remain the final arbiter of whether a particular effort meets 
applicable regulatory requirements. This role allows the CFTC to ensure 
that SROs are not interpreting or applying Core Principles in ways that are 
contradictory or unreasonable. CFTC oversight also helps prevent bad faith 
 
 146 A “systemically important derivatives clearing organization” is defined in Regulation 
39.2 to mean a DCO registered under section 5b of the CEA that is designated by the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council to be systemically important and for which the 
Commission acts as the Supervisory Authority pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 5462(8). 17 C.F.R. § 
39.2 (2020). 
 147 CEA Section 5b, 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1 (2018). See Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 
supra note 145 (identifying Core Principles for DCOs). 
 148 See CEA Section 5b, 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1 (2018). See also Heath P. Tarbert, The Enduring 
Legacy of the Dodd-Frank Act’s Derivatives Reforms, 6 J. FIN. REGUL. 159, 161-62 (2020) 
[hereinafter Tarbert, Enduring Legacy]. 
 149 See, e.g., CCP Supervisory Stress Tests: Reverse Stress Test and Liquidation Stress 
Test, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N (Apr. 2019), https://www.cftc.gov/system/ 
files/2019/05/01/cftcstresstest042019.pdf. 
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interpretations designed to evade regulatory requirements. In sum, the 
CFTC’s role as an interpretive authority is necessary to ensure the self-
regulatory framework is even-handed and retains integrity. 
While these points may seem basic, it is important to recognize that 
while self-regulation can advance regulatory goals, there will always 
remain areas that require government action. This can be especially true 
during a crisis, when quick administrative relief is needed. As discussed in 
more detail in Section IV, addressing the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-
19) required no-action relief from a variety of CFTC regulations. Because 
only the CFTC may grant such relief, the agency had a critical role to play 
in managing the crisis alongside SROs. 
2. International Harmonization 
Another area where government action is necessary relates to 
international harmonization. While SROs are often adept at formulating 
cross-border principles and standards with other SROs,150 the 
government—and particularly a federal agency—is critical to advancing 
harmonized regulatory systems with foreign governmental counterparts. An 
example is the recent harmonization of certain swap data reporting efforts. 
In proposing and finalizing a new system for data reporting by swap dealers 
and swap data repositories, the CFTC has worked to harmonize its 
framework with that of the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA).151 As data is inherently borderless and because swap dealers and 
swap data repositories often must report data to both the CFTC and ESMA, 
harmonizing reporting requirements where appropriate can produce 
significant cost savings and efficiencies for market participants. 
For example, the CFTC’s efforts to bring its swap data reporting 
system into greater harmony with international coordination efforts has led 
to the publication of a CFTC Technical Specification, which contains 128 
reportable data fields.152 The Technical Specification streamlines hundreds 
of prior fields that were previously required by swap data repositories 
operating without clear CFTC guidance. This change will enable the CFTC 
to receive the data it needs to perform its regulatory functions while at the 
same time reducing duplicative reporting burdens for entities subject to 
 
 150 See, e.g., Thomas W. Sexton, III, Nat’l Futures Ass’n President, Keynote Address 
before the Association for Financial Markets in Europe, Annual Compliance and Legal 
Conference, Oct. 3, 2019 (Paris, France), https://www.nfa.futures.org/news/news 
Testimony.asp?ArticleID=5164 (discussing NFA’s role in coordinating international 
governance and compliance standards). 
 151 Domestically, the CFTC has made strides to harmonize its swap data reporting rules 
with the SEC’s reporting requirements for security-based swaps. 
 152 The CFTC’s Part 45 Technical Specification is available at CFTC Technical 
Specification: Parts 43 and 45 swap data reporting and public dissemination requirements, 
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.cftc.gov/media/ 
4891/DMO_Part43_45TechnicalSpecification091720/download. 
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multiple jurisdictions. In proposing revisions to the swap data reporting 
rules, the Chairman of the CFTC stated: 
As it stands today, a market participant with a swap reportable to the 
CFTC might also have to report the same swap to the SEC, the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and perhaps other regulators as 
well. The global nature of our derivatives markets has led to the preparation 
and submission of multiple swap data reports, creating a byzantine maze of 
disparate data fields and reporting timetables. Market participants should 
not incur the costs and burdens of reporting a grab-bag of dissimilar data 
for the very same swap. That approach helps neither the market nor the 
CFTC: conflicting data reporting requirements make regulatory 
coordination more difficult, preventing a panoramic view of risk.153 
Resolving situations like this requires significant federal action to 
coordinate with and align regulatory requirements and technical standards 
with foreign regulators.154 While SROs can be very effective at constructing 
international standards, they lack the ability to place the imprimatur of the 
United States government, as a sovereign nation, on negotiations and 
regulatory efforts. In contrast, CFTC action in the swap data reporting 
context has given assurances to other regulators that harmonization efforts 
have the backing of the United States government. This is important not 
only for the mechanics of promulgating rules, but also for international 
comity: federal support for collaborative efforts sends a strong signal to 
foreign governmental counterparts that can lay the groundwork for future 
cooperation. 
Signaling aside, there is a practical reason to prefer government action 
in the international harmonization space. Just as states and localities do not 
negotiate treaties,155 leaving regulatory harmonization efforts primarily to 
federal agencies is important to produce a unified and holistic message. The 
numerous exchanges in the derivatives space—each an SRO in its own 
right—have varying interests and priorities that could complicate efforts to 
place them in charge of harmonization efforts with overseas regulators. The 
ability of the CFTC to speak with one voice on behalf of the U.S. 
derivatives markets when negotiating and collaborating with foreign 
regulators is a clear benefit of federal action in the international space. 
 
 153 Heath P. Tarbert, Statement of Chairman Heath P. Tarbert in Support of Proposed 
Rules on Swap Data Reporting, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N (Feb. 20, 2020), 
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/tabertstatement022020. 
 154 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Global Regulatory Challenge to U.S. 
Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 695, 712 (2005) (“U.S. federal regulators 
have supported international harmonization of regulatory standards, and adopted 
international standards domestically . . . .”). 
 155 See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in the Age of Treaties, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 892, 900 (2004) (“The authority over foreign affairs in general and treaty 
making in particular is perhaps the most explicit, detailed, and expansive power that the 
Constitution delegates to the federal government.”). 
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3. Systemic Risk Mitigation 
CFTC action is also necessary to address systemic risk. As mentioned 
above, the numerous derivatives exchanges in the United States have 
authority over only those persons and entities that trade on a particular 
exchange. This can create complications for self-regulation where systemic 
risks are involved, as self-regulatory authority is divided among the various 
exchanges. In contrast, the CFTC has broad jurisdiction and surveillance 
capabilities that extend across the derivatives markets rather than being 
confined to particular exchanges. This gives the CFTC a uniquely broad 
picture of market-wide risk, coupled with the ability to assert jurisdiction 
beyond the confines of a particular exchange or market segment, allowing it 
to address systemic threats to the financial system. 
The CFTC’s 2020-2024 Strategic Plan expressly includes “[t]aking 
steps to avoid systemic risk,” which “will not only protect market 
participants, but increase confidence in the soundness of U.S. derivatives 
markets.”156 An example is the finalization of the capital rule for swap 
dealers and major swap participants, which the CFTC approved in 2020. In 
establishing minimum capital requirements, the rule is intended in part to 
reduce systemic risk in the financial system by serving as “the ultimate 
backstop, ensuring that customers are protected and the financial system 
remains sound in the event that all other measures fail.”157 
The CFTC as a federal agency also has a unique ability to coordinate 
with other federal regulators in the mitigation of systemic risk. One key 
example is the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), which was 
formed in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. FSOC is chaired by the 
Secretary of the Treasury and has ten voting members, which include the 
heads of federal financial regulators including the CFTC. 
The FSOC brings federal regulators together “to constrain excessive 
risk in the financial system.”158 Among other things, FSCO facilitates 
regulatory cooperation in the systemic risk space through information 
sharing, standard setting, and the ability to designate financial market 
utilities as systemically important.159 
Finally, someone must be responsible for examining the safety and 
soundness of the exchanges and clearinghouses themselves. At the time of 
this article, there are sixteen exchanges and ten clearinghouses registered 
with the CFTC. Two of these clearinghouses—CME and ICE—are 
 
 156 CFTC Strategic Plan 2020-2024 at 5, 14, (2020), https://www.cftc.gov/media/3871/ 
CFTC2020_2024StrategicPlan/download. 
 157 CFTC, Statement of Chairman Heath P. Tarbert in Support of Final Swap Dealer 
Capital Rule (July 22, 2020), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/ 
tarbertstatement072220. 
 158 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, “About FSOC,” https://home.treasury.gov/policy-
issues/financial-markets-financial-institutions-and-fiscal-service/fsoc/about-fsoc. 
 159 Id. 
Self-Regulation in Derivatives Markets 
41:175 (2021) 
205 
systemically important financial market utilities under Title VIII of the 
Dodd-Frank Act. The CFTC exercises its oversight role over clearinghouses 
by, among other things, developing and managing a supervision program 
that provides for regular examinations and supervisory stress testing.160 As 
clearinghouses represent critical financial market infrastructure, the CFTC 
is uniquely situated to exercise direct oversight over them. 
4. Non-Members of SROs 
A final area where CFTC action is necessary is the case of non-
members of SROs. While SROs have significant self-regulatory authority 
over their members, there is relatively little action they can take against 
non-members. SROs may not, for example, address fraud committed by bad 
actors that are neither SRO members nor trade derivatives on a registered 
exchange. In contrast, the CFTC’s Division of Enforcement can civilly 
prosecute these actors regardless of their registration status or whether they 
have used a derivatives exchange in connection with their misconduct. 
A recent example includes a series of CFTC enforcement actions161 
against commodity trading advisors that failed to become and remain 
members of the NFA as required.162 As the former Division of Enforcement 
Director remarked, ‘“NFA plays a critical role in the oversight of CFTC 
registrants . . . . But NFA can only do its part if registrants submit to its 
jurisdictional requirements.”163 Where CFTC registrants fail to submit to 
NFA jurisdiction, “the CFTC will act to ensure compliance and to preserve 
the NFA’s ability to carry out its important oversight function.”164 
This includes fraud and manipulation in the cash markets, which 
involve “spot” transactions that are not connected to any exchange. While 
the CFTC does not exercise general regulatory authority over spot 
commodity transactions, Section 6(c)(1) of the Commodity Exchange Act 
and Regulation 180.1 give the CFTC the ability to civilly prosecute fraud 
and manipulation “in connection with” a commodity in interstate 
commerce.165 The CFTC has used this authority to target Bitcoin and digital 
asset fraud, the misappropriation of confidential information in connection 
with oil markets, leveraged precious metals transactions, and other illicit 
activity.166 
 
 160 Tarbert, Enduring Legacy, supra note 148, at 160-61. 
 161 Press Release, CFTC press rel. no. 8232-20, CFTC Charges 10 Commodity Trading 
Advisors for Failing to Maintain NFA Memberships (Sept. 3, 2020), https://www.cftc.gov/ 
PressRoom/PressReleases/8232-20. 
 162 Commodity trading advisors are required to be members of a registered futures 
association pursuant to CFTC Regulation 170.17, 17 C.F.R. § 170.17 (2020). 
 163 Press Release, James M. McDonald, CFTC press rel. no. 8232-20, supra note 161. 
 164 Id. 
 165 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) (2018); 17 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2020). 
 166 See, e.g., CFTC v. McDonnell, 332 F. Supp. 3d 641, 717 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (digital 
asset fraud); Order Instituting Proceedings pursuant to Section 6(c) and (d) of the 
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In sum, while the day-to-day regulation of members of exchanges and 
futures associations is committed to SROs, the CFTC retains the ultimate 
authority to enforce the Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC regulations as 
to “persons that trade or influence the trading of derivatives contracts, 
regardless of their CFTC registration status.”167 The CFTC’s role as a 
backstop for all conduct affecting the U.S. derivatives markets 
appropriately defers to self-regulation while preventing non-registration 
from providing an escape hatch from either regulatory oversight or 
accountability for fraud and manipulative conduct. 
IV. THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC RESPONSE 
Having identified the varying roles the CFTC and SROs play within 
U.S. derivatives markets, one should examine how these roles culminated 
in a high degree of collaboration that provided stability during one of the 
most challenging periods in U.S. economy history: the unprecedent market 
volatility wrought by the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19). As 
demonstrated further below, the key to success in addressing the market 
fallout of the pandemic has not been relying solely on either a governmental 
or self-regulatory approach, but rather identifying the strengths of each and 
deploying them side-by-side in a collaborative way. 
And that collaboration was critical to manage a severe economic crisis 
that produced historic volatility throughout the derivatives markets. During 
March of 2020, nearly every asset was in freefall, including equities, 
commodities, and Treasury bills.168 Confidence in the markets was 
plummeting, as seen in the soaring prices for credit default swaps—
essentially, insurance on the risk of default.169 Ensuring that the derivatives 
markets and those who rely on them were adequately positioned to weather 
the storm required the knowledge and experience of both the CFTC and 
SROs, each acting in their appropriate capacities. 
A. Formal Coordination 
One response to the COVID-19 pandemic was the quick formation of 
new, formal structures for coordination action between the CFTC and 
SROs. In turn, the information gleaned from these structures has been 
shared with other regulators by virtue of the CFTC’s role as the primary 
regulator for the U.S. derivatives markets. Together, these avenues for 
 
Commodity Exchange Act, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions, In the 
Matter of Marcus Schultz, CFTC Docket No. 20-76 (Sept. 30, 2020), 
https://www.cftc.gov/media/4871/enfmschultzorder093020/download (misappropriation of 
confidential information relating to oil swaps); CFTC v. Monex Credit Co., 931 F.3d. 966 
(9th Cir. 2019) (leveraged precious metals transactions). 
 167 Mark, supra note 11, at 459. 
 168 See Tarbert, Volatility, supra note 2. 
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formal coordination enabled the CFTC and SROs manage the initial fallout 
of COVID-19 without missteps. 
A primary example was the formation of the Financial Sector 
Coronavirus Working Group, led by the Financial Services Information 
Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC), an industry consortium.170 The 
FS-ISAC Coronavirus Working Group has brought together representatives 
from the financial services industries, the NFA, and federal regulators such 
as the CFTC to share information and market intelligence relating to the 
pandemic. Among other things, the Working Group facilitates information 
exchange relating to new threats spurred by the pandemic, including fraud 
and cybersecurity risks to the financial sector.171 
The CFTC’s role at the center of U.S. derivatives markets allowed it to 
convey intelligence gathered from coordinated efforts with SROs to other 
federal and state regulators, advancing unified responses to market events. 
The CFTC’s ability to utilize its own unique data sets—while at the same 
time having the benefit of information provided by SROs—promoted a 
broader federal response to the pandemic. An example is the CFTC’s 
participation in the FSOC and the President’s Working Group on Financial 
Markets, which were active during the COVID-19 crisis and served as 
“essential channels for information sharing and coordinated action.”172 
B. Volatility and Systemic Risk Management 
Perhaps the most critical financial response to COVID-19 was 
managing the historic market volatility of March 2020, which drew from 
the expertise of the CFTC, exchanges, clearinghouses, and the NFA. 
Systemic risk became a central issue in the coordinated response to the 
pandemic because much of the early market volatility, as noted above, was 
even more elevated than that of the 2008 financial crisis.173 The central 
concern was ensuring that volatility in the markets did not create instability 
within the financial system more generally. It is one thing for prices to 
swing wildly, but quite another for clearinghouses, exchanges, and firms to 
face a liquidity or solvency crisis. While the CFTC as the government 
regulator at the helm of the U.S. derivatives markets is ideally situated to 
address this kind of systemic risk, it nonetheless relied on assistance and 
coordination from SROs in crafting its response to COVID-19-driven 
 
 170 For more about FS-ISAC, see FS-ISAC, “Who We Are,” https://www.fsisac.com/ 
who-we-are. 
 171 See FS-ISAC website, “Covid-19 Resources,” https://www.fsisac.com/covid19. 
 172 Statement of CFTC Chairman Heath P. Tarbert Regarding COVID-19 Before the 
FSOC Principals Meeting (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Speeches 
Testimony/tarbertstatement032620 [hereinafter Tarbert, FSOC Principals]. 
 173 See Tarbert, Volatility, supra note 2. See also Muhammad Suhail Rizwan et al., 
Systemic risk: The impact of COVID-19, FIN. RES. LETTERS (July 4, 2020), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7334938/ (discussing systemic financial 
risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic). 
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market events. 
The CFTC has performed two primary roles in addressing historic 
levels of market volatility and its concomitant potential for systemic risk. 
The first builds on existing data-sharing efforts between the CFTC and 
SROs, and involves the CFTC’s ability to act as a repository for 
information about market status and function. As SROs are closer than the 
CFTC to the actual trading of derivatives, they are best able to identify and 
share information concerning key market developments. During the 
volatility of March 2020, SROs were in regular communication with the 
CFTC to ensure that the markets, while subject to seesawing prices, were 
nonetheless functioning as expected.174 These communications helped the 
CFTC translate real-time market intelligence into nearly twenty discrete 
regulatory measures designed to keep the markets operating by giving 
market participants the flexibility necessary to continue operations.175 
Second, the CFTC acted to mitigate systemic risk by ensuring that 
derivatives clearinghouses were functioning as necessary to prevent 
financial contagion.176 Importantly, this aspect of the COVID-19 response 
is a textbook case study of self-regulation in action. Clearinghouses acted as 
the first line of defense, working to ensure that counterparties continued to 
post required collateral and margin during the unprecedented volatility of 
March 2020.177 The rules requiring margin and collateral to be posted to 
clearinghouses were established by the CFTC well before the pandemic.178 
Clearinghouses, acting as SROs, acted to fulfill these requirements during a 
period of high volatility. Indeed, on the peak day, clearinghouses based in 
the United States held over $333 billion in initial margin, marking a record 
 
 174 See, e.g., How is the Derivatives Industry Responding to COVID-19, FUTURES 
INDUSTRY ASS’N (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.fia.org/articles/how-derivatives-industry-
responding-covid-19. 
 175 See Coronavirus, CFTC, https://www.cftc.gov/coronavirus (last visited Feb. 5, 2021). 
 176 See Tarbert, Volatility, supra note 2. 
 177 See id. (“Between Feb. 24 and March 14, [2020], a record $54 billion in margin was 
posted to derivatives clearinghouses, and the financial system handled these payments 
without incident.”); see also CFTC, SUPERVISORY STRESS TEST OF CLEARINGHOUSES 5 (Nov. 
2016), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/ 
file/cftcstresstest111516.pdf (“Central clearing also provides a means to monitor and 
mitigate risk. The role of the clearinghouse is to make sure all members have posted 
sufficient margin or collateral at all times to cover trades in both their house and customer 
accounts. Clearinghouses also facilitate significant netting of positions, which tends to 
further reduce risk.”). 
 178 See Tarbert, Volatility, supra note 2 (“One important remedy in the CFTC’s medicine 
cabinet is a post-2008 requirement that derivatives traders post margin for their swap 
positions. Broadly speaking, margin is money or other high-quality collateral that buyers and 
sellers exchange to protect against the risk of default. Many derivatives trades—such as 
futures and interest-rate swaps—are processed through central clearinghouses, which stand 
between the parties and handle the margin process. For derivatives that aren’t centrally 
cleared, the CFTC requires transacting parties to exchange margin through third-party 
custodians.”). 




The CFTC, for its part, monitored the clearinghouses for compliance 
and stability, engaging in near-constant communication with them that went 
far beyond the more routine examinations and supervisory efforts outlined 
in Section III.A.2, above.180 By monitoring closely the “critical ‘pipes’ at 
the clearinghouses through which trades are margined and settled,” the 
CFTC was able to help ensure smooth operation and was poised to react 
quickly if the system began to break down.181 As in other self-regulatory 
models, the clearinghouses as SROs implemented regulatory mandates, but 
in turn were subject to oversight be the CFTC as their primary regulator and 
supervisor. 
Nonetheless, the CFTC’s efforts to monitor for and mitigate systemic 
risk during the COVID-19 crisis were substantially aided by SROs. In 
particular, exchanges and the NFA were critical in identifying rising 
volatility and its impact on market participants. One of the key efforts of 
SROs during the period when volatility was unfolding in March 2020 was 
to engage their members to initiate business continuity plans. In broad 
terms, business continuity plans respond to contingencies that could 
undermine the orderly functioning of the derivatives markets, ensuring that 
business can continue throughout periods of dislocation.182 The NFA, for 
example, contacted all of its futures commission merchant and swap dealer 
members, as well as a large population of its remaining membership, to 
ensure that their business continuity plans were up-to-date and could 
effectively address market volatility arising from the COVID-19 
pandemic.183 
The NFA also worked with members on contingency planning even 
before the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention formally declared 
that COVID-19 was a pandemic to “ensure that their [business continuity] 
plans” accounted for pandemic-driven dislocations, including ensuring that 
communication systems with key entities such as a derivatives clearing 
organizations were robust, and advising members to prepare for the 
possibility that COVID-19 could “materially impact their businesses.”184 
These and other efforts helped mitigate systemic risk by enabling NFA 
members to weather the ensuing market volatility. 
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C. Governmental Regulatory Relief 
While SROs worked with their members to help ensure smooth trading 
and operations during the COVID-19 pandemic, the statutory framework 
governing the U.S. derivatives markets created areas where CFTC 
regulatory relief was necessary. That relief reflected collaboration with 
SROs, which helped identify areas of concern and proposed solutions 
necessary to navigate the market effects of the pandemic. In many 
instances, SROs marshalled feedback from their members and conveyed 
those views to the CFTC, which responded with temporary no-action relief 
from relevant regulations. This relief provided market participants with the 
flexibility to continue trading activities in a seamless manner despite 
historic levels of volatility combined with changes in how the nation’s 
workforce operated. 
A key example of SRO-CFTC collaboration in fashioning temporary 
no-action relief during the COVID-19 pandemic has been various measures 
designed to accommodate social distancing. It became clear early on during 
the COVID-19 crisis that “[s]ocial distancing . . . created novel hurdles to 
complying with regulatory requirements that were written with traditional 
centralized offices in mind.”185 Recognizing this issue, exchanges contacted 
the CFTC’s Division of Market Oversight and “indicated that . . . market 
participants may be unable to comply with . . . self-regulatory requirements 
imposed under exchange rules,” including voice recording, location-based 
trading, and electronic timestamp requirements.186 The exchanges also 
expressed concern about their ability to comply with related CFTC 
regulations concerning audit-trail and market-monitoring requirements.187 
In granting temporary no-action relief from these regulatory 
requirements, the CFTC made clear that exchanges were expected “to 
remain particularly vigilant in their self-regulatory functions and to 
implement compensating controls” in order to guard against market 
participants who might “take advantage of market volatility to engage in 
improper trading.”188 The CFTC also stipulated that exchanges had to 
“continue to conduct customer business in accordance with . . . exchange 
rules,” and required that exchange rules not affected by social distancing 
efforts would “continue to apply” to trading during the period of no-action 
relief.189 
The comprehensive and diverse nature of CFTC no-action relief 
provides a significant window into the collaborative nature of the CFTC-
SRO relationship in times of crisis. First, relying on their on-the-ground 
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position with respect to market participants and the dynamics of 
implementing COVID-19 response measures such as social distancing, the 
exchanges were quickly able to identify areas where pandemic responses 
would create tension with regulatory requirements. Second, the CFTC—in 
granting no-action relief from certain regulatory requirements—relied on 
exchanges to “implement compensating controls” to ensure fair trading. 
This is an important example of principles-based regulation190 in the SRO 
space: the CFTC issued a broad instruction based on the principle that 
derivatives trading should be free of misconduct. Exchanges, acting as 
SROs, were left to determine the most effective means of producing that 
result during a period of market volatility. Furthermore, in granting no-
action relief, the CFTC relied on exchanges to continue to enforce their 
own rules, thus trusting the SRO structure to safeguard trading during a 
period in which relief from certain regulatory controls was needed. 
Finally, the pandemic demonstrated that certain regulatory measures 
must fall squarely within the CFTC’s purview, showing the enduring need 
for federal action alongside self-regulation. In particular, COVID-19 
created implementation concerns regarding the ability of some market 
participants to comply with the CFTC’s margin rules for uncleared 
swaps.191 These transactions are generally conducted bilaterally, outside the 
exchanges and not managed by a clearinghouse. They are therefore outside 
traditional SROs and parties to these trades are not necessarily NFA 
members. The CFTC responded by issuing an interim final rule that 
extended the margin compliance deadline by one year.192 Unlike the no-
action relief described above, here the CFTC issued an interim final rule 
that had the effect of modifying a prior rule that established an earlier 
compliance deadline for the CFTC’s margin rules.193 As the margin rules 
are established by CFTC regulations, only CFTC action could provide this 
relief, underscoring the need for a federal role within a system that greatly 
benefits from the dynamism of SROs. 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. derivatives markets are evolving rapidly, fueled by 
digitalization trends that are creating new asset types and bringing new 
participants into the markets. One constant has remained amidst this 
change: a strong self-regulatory tradition that relies on a combination of 
governmental and private efforts. The collaborative response to COVID-19 
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is only the most recent example of self-regulation at work in the U.S. 
derivatives markets. While the framework described in this article may 
evolve with the markets, its basic tenets of CFTC oversight coupled with 
self-regulation by exchanges, clearinghouses, and the NFA are time-tested 
and robust, while simultaneously flexible enough to address innovation and 
change. In sum, self-regulation in U.S. derivatives markets continues to 
provide stability through collaboration. 
 
 
